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Abstract: Loan and bond finance during 1985-2005 can be divided into three sub-periods. After the 1982 debt 
crisis, which mainly involved domestic and foreign bank loans to both the corporate and government sectors, 
there was practically no credit. This situation of lack of credit persisted until the domestic economy was 
stabilized in 1991 with the Convertibility Plan, and foreign debt renegotiation was completed in 1993 with the 
Brady Plan. Loan finance recovered to unprecedented levels since the 1950s, and bond finance became for the 
first time an important financing vehicle for both the national government and large firms in the corporate 
sector. Credit came to a sudden stop in 2001, with widespread default on both corporate and government 
bonds. The 2001 debt crisis was not followed by runaway domestic inflation, and by 2005 Argentina was able 
to return to foreign capital markets. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This document describes the evolution of loan and bond finance over the 1985-2005 period. 
The period can be roughly divided into three sub-periods that differ widely with respect to 
monetary regime, fiscal policy and access to credit. 
As to inflation, at first it was very high, exploding into hyperinflation. Over the 
1991-2001 period, Argentina stabilized the economy through the Convertibility Plan, which 
pegged the peso to the US dollar at a one to one rate. Since 2002, the country has reverted 
to a floating exchange rate, but inflation has remained at moderate levels (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Annual inflation rates (log difference of end-year CPI) 
Source: based on Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC), Argentina. 
 
 
This monetary evolution is paralleled by the fiscal evolution (Figure 2). The public 
sector initially had a large budget deficit, and resorted to inflationary finance because it was 
cut off from credit. Afterwards, the public sector was able to reduce the budget deficit and 
recover access to credit. Finally, after the national and provincial governments lost access 


































































5  3 
Figure 2. Consolidated budget deficit of national and provincial governments 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: based on budget accounts, accrual basis, from Ministerio de Economía (2004) and web site. 
 
The post-Convertibility period is peculiar in that, unlike previous episodes of fiscal 
crises and very high devaluations, the economy did not return to a regime of high inflation. 
Initially, this was helped by the quantitative restrictions on bank withdrawals (corralito, 
corralón). The public sector also managed to keep the fiscal accounts in order, thanks to the 
relief provided by default, the important tax increases instituted in 2001 and 2002 through 
taxes on checks and on agricultural exports, and the fact that pensions, which have a very 
large share in national expenditure, were not adjusted with inflation. 
The change in fiscal situation is patent when one looks at the deficit of the public 
sector at the national and provincial levels. Though some provinces had displayed sound 
fiscal  management,  the  aggregate  of  provinces  had  fiscal  deficits  from  1985  to  2002. 
Moreover, financing requirements kept on mounting in many provinces until the situation 
collapsed at the end of 2001, leading to partial or total default in almost all provinces. 
However, from 2002 on the fiscal position of the provinces improved. Provincial accounts 
recovered due to a surge in receipts, following the increasing trend of national income and 
inflation, which went hand in hand with a retarded adjustment of expenditure. However, 












































































P  4 
shows that the increase in the primary surplus of the national government was especially 
strong, giving it leverage to control and put provincial finances in order. 
 
Figure 3. Primary balance of national and provincial governments  
(as a percentage of GDP) 
Source: based on budget accounts, accrual basis, from Ministerio de Economía (2004) and web site. 
 
In relation to the evolution of credit, when the government nationalized the foreign 
debt of private firms in 1981/82, the debt crisis translated into a huge fiscal crisis. During 
the 1980s no lasting solution was found to the 1982 debt crisis and Argentina remained cut 
off from foreign capital markets. Domestic capital markets were highly regulated and the 
banking system was financially repressed, with negative real rates of interest. Banks were 
mostly used to keep savings in dollars in the bank’s safety vaults, while there was only a 
limited use of current accounts and time deposits with short maturities. 
In the 1990s, pro-market reforms fostered the development of domestic financial 
and capital markets. Corporate bonds (obligaciones negociables or ON), which had legally 
existed since 1988, started to become important as a financing vehicle after the government 
instituted tax changes in 1991. There was an opening of the country to international capital 
flows after the restructuring of the government’s foreign bank debt was completed in 1993, 










































































































Provincial primary balance  5 
Credit came to an abrupt stop in March 2001. A salient problem was the difficulty 
of  the  national  and  provincial  governments  to  service  their  debt,  after  several  years  of 
sluggish growth, with rising interest payments and falling tax revenues since 1998. The 
corporate sector was also highly indebted, so the value of both government and corporate 
bonds plunged sharply after March 2001, and was followed by widespread default. By mid-
2005,  the  national  government  was  able  to  renegotiate  its  debt.  Most of  the  provincial 
governments and corporate debtors had also stepped out of default by the end of 2005. 
In  what follows, we briefly  review the behavior of domestic bank loans, before 
analyzing  the  evolution  of  the  stock  of  bonds  issued  by  the  national  government,  the 
provincial governments, the central bank and the corporate sector. We then look at pension 
funds,  the  most  important  institutional  investors.  Finally,  we  describe  the  evolution  of 
secondary bond markets. 
 
II. Domestic bank loans 
 
The  domestic  financial  sector  has  been  particularly  affected  by  the  macroeconomic 
evolution of Argentina. In the 1980s, the process of increasing inflation that ended in the 
1989/90 hyperinflations practically reduced to nothing the monetization of the economy, 
and the size of the financial sector. The price stability brought about with the Convertibility 
Plan launched in 1991 eventually lead to monetization levels not reached since the 1950s, 
and the financial sector experienced a great boom. 
These  domestic  developments  went  hand  in  hand  with  the  opening  up  of 
international capital markets that had been closed since the 1982 debt crisis. However, new 
foreign credit during the 1990s predominantly took the form of bond finance, not of bank 
finance as in the past. 
The recession that started in 1998 became a deep plunge of economic activity after 
March 2001, making the financial system face more and more non-performing debt from 
the private sector, at the same time that the public sector was cut off from international 
credit  and  resorted  increasingly  to  the  financial  resources  most  at  hand.  With  the 
widespread default of the public and private sectors in 2002, the financial system went 
completely broke. However, the government actions to defuse the effects of the financial   6 
crisis, together with the strong economic upturn since 2002, have slowly lead the financial 
sector to recover. 
 
A. Loans to the private sector  
 
Most of the 1980s was characterized by a system of directed credit, where the central bank 
forced  the  financial  system  to  hold  high  reserve  requirements  that  it  channeled  though 
rediscounts to national and provincial public banks. Public banks gave loans to specified 
productive activities, or mortgages at subsidized rates. This system collapsed with the 1989 
hyperinflation. 
Gradually, some of the most important public banks were closed because of gross 
mismanagement, for example the Banco Nacional de Desarrollo, the national development 
bank that had been used to subsidize investment projects with disastrous financial results. 
Others reduced their scale and were privatized, for example the Banco Hipotecario and 
most provincial banks. However, the two largest public banks, namely Banco de la Nación 
Argentina  and  Banco  de  la  Provincia  de  Buenos  Aires,  remained  untouched  and  keep 
operating until today (both concentrated 21 % of the credit to the private sector in 2005).  
The stability brought about by Convertibility with the pegging of the exchange rate, 
together with financial liberalization, allowed the financial sector to develop quickly and 
the coefficients of monetization to recover from the record low of 1990. Except for a brief 
interruption  during  1995,  with  the  Mexican  crisis,  deposits  and  loans  grew  constantly 
during this period. The average stock of bank loans reached a peak of 27% of GDP between 
1998 and 1999. At that moment, loans to the private sector represented 86 % of total loans.  
As  Figure  4  shows,  between  1999  and  2004,  loans  to  the  private  sector  fall 
continuously as a percentage of GDP, practically shrinking to one third of their former size. 
Unlike smaller firms, larger firms at first had the option of financing themselves at lower 
rates through the placement of corporate bonds, and the use of credit lines from foreign 
banks. The fall of bank loans to the private sector accelerated with the system-wide crisis 
started in 2001 and the devaluation of the peso.   7 
Figure 4.  Bank loans (as a percentage of GDP) 
Source: based on average of end-of-month stocks from January to December, Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
 
The precipitous fall has several explanations. First, the net cancellation of debt that 
was  encouraged  by  banks  when  they  started  to  experience  liquidity  problems  that 
eventually lead to a generalized bank run. Second, the strong growth of non-performing 
debt, which started to be written off in recent years. Furthermore, some of the debtors 
voluntarily  cancelled  their  loans,  taking  advantage  of  the  possibilities  provided  by  the 
government in 2001 to firms with delinquent loans of canceling debt at the face value of 
public bonds, a very attractive option since this implied a large discount. The cost was 
imposed on banks, which were obliged to receive insolvent government debt that later went 
into default instead of (potentially insolvent) private sector debt. In 2002, this option was 
extended to all debtors with the use of reprogrammed deposits (Cedros, that could also be 
bought at a discount). In this case, the subsidy was provided by the depositors that decided 
to get rid of their Cedros at a large discount. Loans to firms dropped more strongly than 
loans to families. In early 2002, loans to the private sector were pesified at an exchange rate 
of 1 to 1. On the other hand, loans to the public sector, as well as government bonds held 
by banks, were pesified at an exchange rate of 1.4 pesos for dollar, as were dollar deposits. 
That implies that domestically indebted private firms experienced the greatest deal of debt 
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After the reduction of the debt burden with pesification (75 % of domestic loans 
were denominated in foreign currency), in the post-Convertibility years the private sector 
did not rely much on bank loans. Loans only started to recover later. Between 2004 and 
2005, the average loans to the private sector grew at 32 % annual rates, in nominal terms, 
though the starting point was very low. The reestablishment of the supply of loans reflected 
the gradual improvement in the liquidity, solvency and profitability of the financial system. 
Despite  these  improvements,  the  financial  system  had  structural  problems,  like  the 
scarceness of long-term financing  (80% of deposits were at most 30-day deposits), the 
absence of an indexing mechanism that cold limit uncertainty, and the increased risk after 
the generalized breach of contracts in 2002.  
 
B. Loans to the public sector 
 
At the same time that loans to the private sector started to fall in the late 1990s, with the 
deterioration of public accounts the public sector started to demand more funds, to which 
were added the problems of placing government bonds in 2001 (though the public sector 
might have been crowding out the private sector, in light of economic slowdown many 
banks wanted to reduce their exposition to private firms anyways). 
Especially important in the late 1990s was the growth of loans to the provincial 
government sector, which in certain moments explains more than 70% of the credit to the 
public sector. These loans were favored by a fiscal pact reached by Minister of Economy 
Cavallo with the provinces in 1992 to approve the tax reforms in Congress. In exchange for 
this agreement, the provinces were assured a revenue floor of 725 million pesos a month 
(this floor was raised to 740 million in 1994, jumping to 1,350 million pesos in 2000, and 
1,364  million  pesos  in  2001,  levels  which  amid  the  recession  and  fall  in  tax  revenues 
became impossible for the national government to comply with). On the other hand, the 
national government never tapped the financial system much during the 1990s, and bank 
loans never exceeded 2 or 3% of national debt.   
Loans to the provinces amounted on average to 2% of GDP (5 billion pesos) in 
1994, as shown in Figure 5. One can also infer that in the early 1990s most outstanding   9 
loans to the public sector corresponded to provinces. Bank loans to provincial governments 
as a share of GDP remained constant between 1994 and 1998, but from then until 2001 they 
doubled. In 2001, 90% of bank loans to provinces were denominated in foreign currency. 
 
Figure 5. Loans to provinces and total public sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
Note: based on average of end-of-month stocks from January to December, Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
 
After  November  2001,  loans  to  the  public  sector  grow  due  to  the  distortions 
introduced  by  the  government,  with  the  asymmetric  pesification  and  the  compulsory 
transformation of bank assets. In 2002, bank debt was first pesified at a rate of 1.4 pesos for 
dollar, as mentioned above. As to the compulsory transformation of assets, the government 
bonds held by banks were transformed into Guaranteed Loans (Préstamos Garantizados). 
Inversely, old loans to the public sector, basically made up of loans to provinces, were 
exchanged for a new bond, the Bogar. Both are described in more detail in the sections on 
national and provincial government debt. Though the bank statistics are obscured by all 
these transformations, it is important to emphasize that there have been no new bank loans 
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III. National government bonds 
 
The Ministerio de Economía, the ministry of economics of the national government, has an 
official  series  with  a  detailed  breakdown  of  the  stock  of  bonds  issued  by  the  national 
government since 1994. However, there are more aggregate figures since 1992. Table 1 
shows the evolution of the stock of bonds as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 1. Stock of national government bonds (as a percentage of GDP) 
   Domestic bonds 
(debt issued using domestic law) 
Foreign bonds 
(debt issued under foreign law) 
  Foreign 
currency 
Domestic currency  Domestic currency 












































1992  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0  0  0  7.3  0  0.3  0  0  0  0.3  7.7 
1993  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0  0  0  8.8  0  11.7  0  0  0  11.7  20.5 
1994  0  5.2  0  2.7  0  0  0  7.9  0  11.7  0  0  0  11.7  19.6 
1995  0  6.5  0  2.3  0  0  0  8.8  0  13.7  0  0  0  13.7  22.5 
1996  0  5.9  0.3  2.6  0  0  0  8.8  0  16.3  0.1  0  0  16.4  25.2 
1997  0.6  5.8  0.4  2.4  0  0  0  9.2  0  15.6  0.4  0  0  16.0  25.2 
1998  1.1  5.3  0  2.3  0  0  0  8.7  0  18.2  0.3  0  0  18.5  27.2 
1999  1.5  6.7  0  1.9  0  0  0  10.1  0  21.3  0.3  0  0  21.6  31.7 
2000  1.8  8.6  0  1.2  0  0  0  11.6  0  22.6  0.3  0  0  22.9  34.5 
2001  2.5  3.2  0  0.3  0  0  0  6.0  0  16.7  0.3  0  0  17.0  23.0 
2002  0  13.8  0  0.8  0  13.3  0  27.8  0  52.0  0  0  0  52.0  79.8 
2003  0  10.2  0  0.6  0  16.4  0  27.2  0  49.9  0  0  0  49.9  77.1 
2004  0  9.2  0  0.8  0  14.0  0  23.9  0  39.0  0  0  0  39.0  62.9 
2005  0  9.6  0.9  0.2  0  25.9  0  36.6  0  10.1  0  0  0  10.1  46.7 
Note: based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina. Stocks refer to year-end figures. Short term is maturity up to one year, 
long term more than one year; n.a. is not available. Data for period 1985-1992 is not available. 
 
The  statistics  of  debt  compiled  by  the  Secretaría  de  Financiamiento  of  the 
Ministerio de Economía are based on a cash criterion: debt is registered when the bond is 
given to the creditor, not when the liability is generated. This difference is important in 
understanding  the  evolution  of  debt  in  Argentina,  since  each  round  of  macroeconomic 
turmoil in the last two decades has lead to a pileup of unpaid liabilities that only show up in 
official statistics several years later, when the government normalizes the financial situation 
(López Isnardi and Dal Din 1998). The flow measures of the budget deficit, which are 
measured both on a cash and an accrual basis, do not register and reflect these skeletons in 
the closet either.   11 
 
  Besides the information on outstanding bonds, most of which went into default at 
the end of 2001, we present in Table 2 a detail of bonds in arrears, holdouts, and guaranteed 
loans (which were originally issued as bonds) to get a comprehensive picture of the whole 
scene. 
 
Table 2. Adjusted stock of national government bonds (as a percentage of GDP) 
Guaranteed Loans  
(domestic law) 1/ 
Domestic currency 
 




on bond principal 
(domestic and  
foreign law) 
Holdouts  
(domestic and  
foreign law)  Foreign 




2000  34.5  0  0  0  0  0  34.5 
2001  23.0  0.0  0.0  15.7  0  0  38.7 
2002  79.8  8.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  24.5  113.0 
2003  77.1  12.6  0.0  0.0  0.2  10.7  100.7 
2004  62.9  18.1  0.0  0.0  0.2  9.6  90.8 
2005  46.7  0.0  9.9  0.0  0.1  8.1  65.1 
Notes: 1/ Guaranteed loans were in US dollars until the end of 2001; thereafter they were pesified. 
 
  Tables 3 and 4 present the information of Tables 1 and 2 in millions of dollars. 
 
Table 3. Stock of national government bonds (in millions of dollars) 
   Domestic bonds 
(debt issued using domestic law) 
Foreign bonds 
(debt issued under foreign law) 
  Foreign 
currency
  
Domestic currency  Domestic currency 












































1992  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0  0  0  16,434  0  750  0  0  0  750  17,184 
1993  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0  0  0  20,705  0  27,696  0  0  0  27,696  48,401 
1994  0 13,485  0 6,878  0  0  0  20,363  0  30,213  0  0  0  30,213  50,576 
1995  0 16,893  0 5,882  0  0  0  22,775  0  35,396  0  0  0  35,396  58,171 
1996  0 16,062  859 7,059  0  0  0  23,980  0  44,294  250  0  0  44,544  68,524 
1997  1,762 16,939 1,275 6,975  0  0  0  26,950  0  45,661  1,250  0  0  46,911  73,861 
1998  3,295 15,850  0 6,800  0  0  0  25,945  0  54,372  1,000  0  0  55,372  81,317 
1999  4,174 18,938  0 5,407  0  0  0  28,519  0  60,360  983  0  0  61,343  89,862 
2000  5,108 24,474  0 3,482  0  0  0  33,065  0  64,165  928  0  0  65,092  98,157 
2001  6,746  8,551  0  810  0  0  0  16,108  0  44,967  694  0  0  45,661  61,769 
2002  0 12,642  0  729  0  12,194  0  25,566  0  47,768  0  0  0  47,768  73,334 
2003  0 13,105  0  808  0  21,172  0  35,086  0  64,240  6  0  0  64,246  99,332 
2004  0 13,762  0 1,149  0  21,004  0  35,914  0  58,649  6  0  0  58,655  94,569 
2005  0 16,841 1,555  353  0  45,277  0  64,025  0  17,695  0  0  0  17,695  81,720 
Note: our construction, based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina. Stocks refer to year-end figures. Short term is maturity 
up to one year, long term more than one year; n.a. is not available. Data for period 1985-1992 is not available. 
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Table 4. Adjusted stock of national government bonds (in millions of dollars) 
Guaranteed Loans  
(domestic law) 1/ 
Domestic currency 
 




on bond principal 
(domestic and  
foreign law) 
Holdouts  
(domestic and  
foreign law)  Foreign 




2000  98,157  0  0  0  0  0  98,157  
2001  61,769  0  0  42,258  0  0  104,027  
2002  73,334  7,715  0  0  252  22,545  103,845  
2003  99,332  16,292  0  0  288  13,813  129,724  
2004  94,569  27,179  0  0  279  14,367  136,393  
2005  81,720  0  17,966  0  192  14,075  113,953  
Notes: 1/ Guaranteed loans were in US dollars until the end of 2001; thereafter they were pesified. 
 
A.  Domestic bonds 
 
Bonds had  a low participation in national government debt during the  1980s, hovering 
between 5 and 8% of the total, with a declining tendency, and amounted to only 3 billion 
US dollars in 1988 (Melconian and Santángelo 1996). Domestic bonds did not go into 
default  during  this  period.  In  contrast,  there  were  no  bond  placements  abroad,  since 
international capital markets were closed to the country. 
Though domestic debt was not an important source of finance during this period, 
sizeable  liabilities  not  recognized  at  that  time  were  generated.  These  liabilities,  plus 
unconsolidated debt, were explicitly registered during the next decade and cancelled with 
government bonds. 
First, as a consequence of the crisis of the financial system in early 1990, the Bonex 
Plan was launched. The crisis originated in the so-called quasi-fiscal deficit that had piled 
up at the Central Bank. The banks had to immobilize deposits (depósitos indisponibles) to 
sterilize monetary expansion generated by local and national government as well as state 
owned enterprises. These funds received a market interest rate and represented 50% of all 
deposits. There was no fiscal stabilization, so inflation started to rise, and so did interest 
rates.  
At  the  end  of  1989,  the  government  decreed  an  exchange  of  these  immobilized 
deposits for ten-year government bonds in dollars, the Bonex 89 (Bonos Externos 1989). In 
turn, the banks gave depositors these bonds in place of their time deposits (sight deposits 
were not affected), and it was mandatory for depositors to accept them. The Bonex 89 were 
also used in exchange of other government debt instruments. There was an issue of 4.5   13 
billion dollars, about 8 % of GDP at the time. The Bonex 89 was a very familiar domestic 
debt bond, because despite its compulsory origin, when it started to be quoted in stock 
exchanges it quickly recovered par value and debt services were paid in full.  
Though  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  population  was  affected,  because 
monetization was extremely low and deposits of the private sector were a mere 4 % of GDP 
in 1990, the compulsive exchange shook the weak trust in the financial system and may 
have  affected  the  speed  of  remonetization  once  the  economy  stabilized.  Though  the 
deposits of the private sector recovered to 25% of GDP in the best period of Convertibility, 
this was still low by Argentina’s standards of the 1940s and early 1950s. The fear of new 
measures with bank deposits materialized during the 2001 crisis. By 2005, the ratio of 
private deposits to GDP grew to around 15 %. 
In a parallel fashion to the Bonex 89, the government issued bonds to consolidate 
previous liabilities: the Bocones (Bonos de Consolidación) Previsionales, after the courts 
ruled against the government in lawsuit after lawsuit because pensions had been paid below 
what the law mandated; and the Bocones Proveedores, because of unpaid debt with state 
suppliers. By Law 23.982 of 1991, the government was able to consolidate the obligations 
that were due before April of that year, when the Convertibility Plan was launched. As the 
1990s progressed, up to the present day, several new bond series of Bocones have been 
issued (including such things as reparation to the families of missing people in the 1970s). 
Their common characteristic is that they capitalize interests for a certain period of time, 
before they start to gradually repay principal. The Bocones were issued both in dollars and 
in pesos. 
Most of the domestic bonds issued during the first years of Convertibility was this 
compulsory or consolidated debt. As mentioned above, in Table 1 this debt is registered 
according to the cash methodology followed by the official statistics of the Ministerio de 
Economía, that is, they are registered the moment that the bond is issued and given to the 
creditor. In the study by López Isnardi and Dal Din (1998), they show that a great deal of 
the growth of debt in the 1990s was in fact explained by the recognition of debt generated 
in previous periods. 
In the mid-1990s, there were also important domestic bond issues, both in pesos and 
in dollars. The Letes (Letras del Tesoro) were issued as short-term instruments, the Bontes   14 
(Bonos del Tesoro) had longer maturities. The domestic debt in government bonds also 
grew marginally due to the recognition of new liabilities, reaching a total of 33 billion US 
dollars, 12% of GDP, at the end of 2000. 
 
B. The Brady Plan and foreign bonds 
 
In the late 1970s, most international Argentine government debt was in the form of loans 
from foreign banks. These loans became non-performing after the Malvinas/Falklands war, 
kicking off the debt crisis of the 1980s.  
During  the  following  years,  there  was  a  slow  and  lengthy  process  to  try  to 
restructure this debt with commercial banks. The financial programs that were negotiated 
implied major financial support from international financial organizations, which strongly 
increased their exposure to Argentina during this period, while commercial banks reduced 
their  participation.  However,  in  1988  Argentina  went  into  complete  default  with 
commercial banks. The IMF cut its support that same year, the World Bank in early 1989. 
After the stabilization brought about by the Convertibility Plan in 1991, the country 
advanced in the normalization of its international debt, completing the process with the 
implementation of the Brady Plan in 1993. Under the Brady Plan, government liabilities 
with foreign banks that were in default were refinanced through guaranteed bonds. In all, 
25.5 billion US dollars were issued in three types of bonds. The agreement included an 
extension of maturities, a reduction of interest rates, and a reduction of the principal in the 
case of the Discount Bonds. The first two bonds, the Par and Discount Bonds, had a thirty-
year  maturity.  The  principal  payments,  as  well  as  one  year  of  interest  payments,  were 
secured with zero coupon bonds from the US Treasury. The funds to secure these payments 
were basically provided by international financial organizations. Interest rate arrears were 
cancelled with a third bond, the FRB. This floating rate bond was issued with a lower 
maturity and with partial redemptions. In the following years, it became a reference point to 
gauge the risk of Argentine bonds because of its high market liquidity. 
The settlement with commercial banks reached through the Brady Plan changed the 
profile of Argentine debt, marking an inflexion point. From that point on, most of the debt 
switched from bank loans, concentrated in the hands of a few creditors, to government   15 
bonds, held by many dispersed investors. Between 1992 and 1993, government debt in 
bonds went up from 7.7% to more than 20 % of GDP. On the other hand, this inaugurated a 
strong comeback to international capital markets by the government, which opened the way 
to the private sector. 
After  the  agreement,  the  government  centered  its  source  of  financing  in  capital 
markets.  The  good  internal  and  external  conditions  that  encouraged  capital  flows 
contributed to this, as well as the need to finance the fiscal deficits. Though the fiscal 
deficit was at a record low in comparison to the decades of 1960, 70 and 80, it was still 
positive. This was in part because of reform of pension system, by which country partially 
switched in 1994 from a pay-as-you go pension system to a capitalization system. These 
changes lead to an increase of the registered fiscal deficit after 1994. That is, the reduction 
of future government liabilities from the pay-as-you go pension system were not registered 
either in the budget deficit measured on a cash basis, nor for that matter in the budget 
deficit measured on an accrual basis. However, since the pay-as-you go pension system has 
an “implicit bond” that pays its debt services with taxes, just like regular government debt, 
the reduction of this “implicit bond” had the same characteristics as an increase in the fiscal 
surplus. 
The  debt  instruments  issued  in  international  markets  became  more  sophisticated 
with time. Eurobonds were issued in different currencies, markets and legislations. Several 
series of Global Bonds were also issued. In the late 1990s, some debt was redeemed before 
maturity, and there were some voluntary exchanges of debt with the aim of improving the 
profile of debt services. A voluntary exchange is usually done with the net present value 
(NPV) of the old bond being equal to the new bond. Thus, in terms of NPV debt does not 
change,  but  in  nominal  terms  it  increases  significantly  because  most  exchanges  try  to 
increase duration; in addition, the yield curve is usually upward sloping. By the end of 
2000, bond debt under foreign legislation reached 65 billion US dollars, 23% of GDP. 
 
C. The 2001 debt crisis 
 
At the end of 2000, Argentina started to encounter serious financial problems. Though there 
had been a failed hint of recovery during the second semester of 1999, the economy had   16 
failed to recover from the recession started in 1998. In December 2000, a rescue package 
(blindaje) of sovereign debt was signed, basically an agreement with international financial 
organizations that provided cheaper funds to refinance debt amortizations, precluding a 
possible debt default. 
  This  financial  “armoring”  was  not  enough,  so  in  mid-2001  the  so-called  Mega-
exchange (Megacanje) was implemented. This exchange was still carried out under market 
conditions: 46 types of sovereign bonds, with a face value of around 30 billion US dollars, 
were exchanged for 6 different types of bonds, mostly in foreign currency. The Mega-
exchange sought to reduce the financial needs of the government over the next five years, 
capitalizing interests and extending the maturity of debt. 
From the point of view of the fiscal intertemporal budget constraint, the fiscal crisis 
perhaps had more to do with the failed handling of a sudden stop, than with the problem of 
debt overhang. Though in terms of present value the debt did not rise, since short term debt 
was being exchanged for long-term debt, and the interest rates Argentina faced shot up to 
very  high  levels,  nominal  debt  increased  significantly  without  any  actual  financing  of 
public sector expenditure, raising the debt to GDP ratio. Even if the present value of debt 
did not rise, at the interest rates of Mega-exchange, the present value of government tax 
collection shrunk precipitously. Hence, what at lower rates might have been a sustainable 
debt level, became at these new rates impossible for the government to continue servicing. 
Given that this exchange was not successful, by November a new exchange was 
launched to provide debt relief. In the November 2001 exchange, sovereign bonds were 
converted into Préstamos Garantizados, guaranteed loans. The objective was to reduce the 
liquidity of sovereign bonds, since these instruments could not be negotiated in capital 
markets. Each bond exchanged at par value for a guaranteed loan extended its maturity 
three years, and the bondholders could choose between a fixed and a variable rate, lower 
than  the  original  rates.  The  currency  was  a  function  of  the  original  bond.  This  new 
exchange determined a reduction in the present value of debt. Eligible bonds had a residual 
face value of 64.4 billion US dollars, of which 41.7 billion were converted, over 40 % of 
sovereign bonds. This conversion of sovereign bonds into guaranteed loans explains the 
strong  drop  in  the  stock  of  bonds  between  the  end  of  2000  and  2001.  This  amount  is 
presented in a separate column in Table 2. A great deal of the investors that accepted to   17 
receive guaranteed loan were the great domestic bondholders, basically banks and pension 
funds, who believed that by entering into this exchange they could help mitigate the critical 
situation the economy and the government faced at the end of that year. 
By that point in time, Argentina had no access to international capital markets. By 
then  the  IMF  had  also  stopped  to  fund  Argentina,  due  to  the  non-compliance  of  the 
conditions  of  the  agreement.  The  crisis  finally  exploded  in  the  financial  system,  when 
capital flight accelerated, and the government imposed restrictions to withdraw funds from 
banks, the so-called corralito, at the beginning of December 2001. Default was inevitable. 
On December 24, 2001, the Argentine Government declared default on the great majority 
of public debt, basically that part comprising sovereign bonds. On the other hand, debt 
obligations with international financial organizations continued to be serviced. 
In  February  2002,  after  leaving  Convertibility  and  devaluing  the  peso,  the 
government  decreed  the  pesification  of  debt.  By  that  decree,  all  bonds  issued  under 
domestic legislation and all guaranteed loans were converted to pesos at a parity of 1.4 
pesos  per  dollar.  Pesified  debt  was  indexed  by  the  Coeficiente  de  Estabilización  de 
Referencia (CER), an index that reflected CPI inflation, plus a 2% spread. The holders of 
guaranteed loans were recognized a higher real interest rate, which varied between 3 and 
5% according to the maturity of the original bond. 
It is worthy of notice that, even though domestic bonds that had been pesified were 
still  in  default,  the  holders  of  guaranteed  loans  that  explicitly  accepted  the  pesification 
received  interest  payments  in  a  timely  manner.  The  government  gave  the  holders  of 
guaranteed  loans  the  explicit  option  of  accepting  the  pesification  under  the  conditions 
imposed,  or  returning  to  the  original  bond  holdings.  As  a  consequence,  debt  for 
approximately 13 billion US dollars reverted back to the original bonds in foreign currency,  
implying an increase in the stock of registered foreign bond debt between the end of 2002 
and 2003. 
This was not the only reason why the stock of sovereign bonds that appears in Table 
1 started to climb, despite the debt reduction that pesification had implied. Though the 
government was in default, domestic sovereign bonds started to be issued to compensate 
the financial system and the depositors for the income transfers that had arisen from the 
pesification of deposits and loans, more than 15 billion US dollars were issued for these   18 
reasons as shown in Table 5. The new bonds issued were the Boden (Bonos del Gobierno 
Nacional) in pesos and in dollars. The Boden were also issued to compensate the 13 % 
reduction in government salaries and pensions carried out in 2001, and to retire provincial 
monies from circulation. All bonds issued in pesos after 2002 were indexed to the CER 
index. 
 





Value as of 
31/Dec/05 
Compensation to financial system 1/  8,809  7,578 
 - in pesos  1,181  857 
 - in dollars  7,629  6,721 
Compensation to depositors  6,479  5,625 
 - in pesos  115  75 
 - in dollars  6,364  5,550 
Rescue of provincial quasi-monies     
 - in pesos  2,114  1,949 
Compensation to public employees and pensioners 2/   
 - in pesos  874  651 
Total 2002-2004  18,276  15,802 
 - in pesos  4,283  3,531 
 - in dollars  13,992  12,271 
Later issues 3/  5,324  5,391 
 - in pesos  2,446  2,808 
 - in dollars  2,878  2,583 
Total issue  23,600  21,193 
 - in pesos  6,730  6,339 
 - in dollars  16,870  14,854 
Notes: 1/ Compensation for asymmetric pesification and indexation (including coverage for pesification of foreign currency 
loans tied to international credit lines); 2/ Restitution of 13% nominal cut in pensions and salaries of public employees; 
3/ Direct placements, as well as some market issue and exchanges for Letes. 
 
There were also new series of Bocones that continued to be issued after default to 
consolidate debts with pensioners and state suppliers. This post-default debt (Boden, new 
Bocones and Préstamos Garantizados) has been timely serviced. 
Due  to  the  diverse  agreements  with  the  provincial  governments  to  alleviate  the 
financial difficulties faced by the provinces, the national government took over a great deal 
of their debt, both bank loans and provincial bonds. This debt was consolidated through a 
16-year bond called Bogar, indexed to the CER index. Though the Ministerio de Economía 
classifies this as indirect debt under the heading of guaranteed debt (deuda garantizada),   19 
we include this bond as a national government bond in Table 1. Its value at present adds up 
to 10 billion US dollars, around 6% of GDP, and has very great liquidity. 
Besides this, foreign legislation bonds, almost all in default, tripled their value in 
terms of GDP as a consequence of the devaluation of the peso and the consequent increase 
of the real exchange rate. The principal arrears on bond debt are presented separately, since 
there is no disaggregate information on the composition of this debt according to domestic 
or foreign legislation, or to currency. 
 
D. Debt renegotiation 
 
The recent exchange and restructuring of Argentine sovereign debt is one of the most well 
reviewed events, so we will be brief. The final exchange offer was launched in January 
2005 and lasted until March. The sovereign bonds eligible for exchange represented 81.8 
billion US dollars, including interest arrears until December 2001. Three types of bonds 
were issued: Par, Discount and Quasi-par, the last one specially designed for domestic 
pension funds. All these bonds additionally included coupons indexed to GDP growth, a 
new negotiable debt instrument, and were issued in four currencies (pesos, dollars, euros 
and yens) under four different legislations. The Discount Bond had a 66% reduction of 
nominal value, the Quasi-par Bond a reduction of 30%, and the Par Bond was issued at the 
same face value, but with lower interest coupons. The reduction in net present value of the 
exchanged debt was around 70%. 
The exchange had an acceptance rate of 76%. The settlement was made in June 
2005. New bonds were issued for a total amount of 35.2 billion US dollars, 15 billion in Par 
Bonds, almost 12 billion in Discount Bonds, and 8.3 billion in Quasi-par bonds. 46% of 
that debt is nominated in pesos, and is under jurisdiction of domestic law.  
The holdouts, which include eligible debt not presented to the exchange, represented 
18 billion US dollars in December 2005. We are not considering it in the total stock of 
bonds in Table 1, putting it instead in a separate column in Table 2. This debt is mostly 
comprised  of  Eurobonds  and  Global  Bonds  in  the  hands  of  foreign  bondholders  that 
decided not to participate in the debt exchange. If these bondholders are treated according   20 
to the pari passu clause, they should at least receive the same offer as holders of Discount 
Bonds, i.e., they should be paid around 6.1 billion US dollars (34% of original debt). 
 
IV. Provincial government bonds 
 
Historically, many provinces resorted to their official provincial banks for loans. These 
provincial  banks  had  counted  with  support  from  the  central  bank  (BCRA)  through 
rediscounts. However, this changed when the Banco Provincia de Buenos Aires almost 
closed in January 1990, when the BCRA excluded it from the Clearing House (Cámara 
Compensadora). The Banco Provincia was able to reach an out-of-court agreement with its 
creditors to restructure its debt. While this large public bank restructured, during the 1990s 
many of the smaller provincial banks were privatized. 
 
Table 6. Stock of provincial government debt (as a percentage of GDP) 

















1995  n.a.  n.a.  0.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1996  n.a.  n.a.  0.9  0  0.8  0.7  2.3  0.4  5.1 
1997  n.a.  n.a.  1.3  0  0.1  0.8  1.5  0.3  4.0 
1998  n.a.  n.a.  1.3  0  0.1  1.0  1.8  0.2  4.4 
1999  n.a.  n.a.  1.7  0  0.1  1.3  2.3  0.4  5.8 
2000  n.a.  n.a.  2.4  0.5  0.1  0.9  2.7  0.8  7.4 
2001  n.a.  n.a.  4.4  1.1  0.1  1.2  3.5  0.9  11.2 
2002  n.a.  n.a.  6.3  11.2  0.1  3.4  0.5  0.4  21.9 
2003  n.a.  n.a.  3.8  10.2  1.5  2.5  0.4  0.4  18.8 
2004  n.a.  n.a.  3.3  9.2  1.5  2.2  0.3  0.4  16.8 
2005 (p)  n.a.  n.a.  2.6  8.1  1.3  1.7  0.2  0.3  14.2 
Note: based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina, and IEERAL for 1995. n.a. is not available. Data for period 1985-1994 is 
not available. 
 
Table 7. Stock of provincial government debt (in millions of dollars) 

















1995  n.a.  n.a.  1,124  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1996  n.a.  n.a.  2,532  0  2,122  1,920  6,276  1,072  13,921 
1997  n.a.  n.a.  3,909  0  389  2,296  4,469  739  11,802 
1998  n.a.  n.a.  3,826  0  233  3,071  5,315  719  13,164 
1999  n.a.  n.a.  4,911  0  236  3,737  6,459  1,223  16,565 
2000  n.a.  n.a.  6,859  1,363  151  2,647  7,563  2,409  20,992 
2001  n.a.  n.a.  11,894  2,882  144  3,202  9,460  2,485  30,067 
2002  n.a.  n.a.  5,766  10,301  137  3,092  463  398  20,156 
2003  n.a.  n.a.  4,842  13,157  1,989  3,262  464  455  24,169 
2004  n.a.  n.a.  4,986  13,865  2,245  3,257  378  527  25,258 
2005 (p)  n.a.  n.a.  4,708  14,890  2,349  3,183  381  552  26,064 
Note: based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina, and IEERAL for 1995. n.a. is not available. Data for period 1985-1994 is 
not available. 
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There are no official consolidated registers of total provincial debt before 1996. 
That year, a national decree made it mandatory for provincial governments to report their 
internal  and  external  debt.  Tables  6  and  7  show  the  evolution  of  provincial  debt  as  a 
percentage of GDP and in millions of dollars.
1 We not only include the evolution of bonds, 
but also of other debt to get a better picture of the whole situation, because part of this other 
debt was restructured and transformed into bonds after 2001. 
According to the information of the Ministerio de Economía, at the end of 1996 the 
total stock of provincial debt amounted to 13.9 billion pesos (5.1% of GDP), of which 2.5 
billion  (0.9%  of  GDP) were  bonds.  In  the  early  1990s,  provinces  relied  mostly  on  the 
financial  sector  loans.  While  loans  represented  45%  of  total  debt  in  1996,  bonds  only 
represented 18%. 
In June 2005, total provincial debt represented 14.2% of GDP, after having reached 
a peak of 21.9% of GDP in 2002. The reduction of debt as a percentage of GDP since 2002 
is due in part to the fall of the real exchange rate, which reduced the weight of external 
debt,  including  bonds  under  foreign  legislation  that  could  not  be  pesified.  Another 
important factor was the change in the fiscal situation. 
 
A. Bonds under domestic legislation 
 
A program to convert provincial government debt was instrumented in November 2001, 
due to the financial restrictions most provincial administrations were suffering. The only 
source of financing for provinces was the national government through a special fund, the 
FFDP (Fondo Fiduciario para el Desarrollo Provincial), because the financial system and 
capital markets had been closed to them since the year before. The goal of the conversion 
was  to  diminish  the  financial  cost  and  extend  the  maturities  of  debt  services.  The 
conversion  comprehended  mainly  domestic  bonds  and  bank  debt.  The  process  was 
interrupted in December due to the national economic and political crisis that exploded 
then;  most  provinces  also  went  into  default.  In  November  2001  values,  eligible  debt 
                                                 
1 We are not able to make a breakdown of the evolution of provincial government bonds according to law of 
issue, since that would require a detailed database of provincial bonds. However, at the end of 2001 there 
were about 4.3 billion US dollars in bonds issued under foreign law, so that would imply around 7.6 billion 
US dollars in bonds issued under domestic law.   22 
amounted to 15.8 billion dollars, of which 92% was nominated in dollars and 50 % were 
bank loans. 
The  national  decrees  that  pesified  the  debt  of  the  public  sector  at  the  national, 
provincial and municipal levels at the beginning of 2002, after the declaration of public 
emergency, affected provincial government debt in dollars, which was pesified at a rate of 
1.40 pesos per dollar, and indexed to inflation through the CER index.  
To handle the accumulated stock of provincial debt, in August 2002 a new process 
of debt conversion was launched through which eligible provincial debt, i.e., provincial 
bonds under national legislation and bank loans, could be voluntarily exchanged for a new 
national government bond. The conversion was also open to bonds under foreign legislation 
that were in the hands of domestic investors willing to accept the exchange. The new bond, 
denominated Bogar (Bono Garantizado), was a 16-year bond in pesos indexed to CER plus 
a 2% annual interest rate. The Bogar carried a guarantee from tax coparticipation, the share 
of  national  tax  collection  that  corresponds  to  provinces.  Up  to  15%  of  national  tax 
coparticipation received by each province could be used to service the Bogar. 
The national government launched this program of financial assistance through the 
FFDP subject to conditionality, the so-called Programa de Financiamiento Ordenado. Since 
2002,  this  has  been  the  only  source  of  finance  of  provinces.  As  a  consequence  of  the 
conversion of provincial debt, in nominal terms 19.6 billion pesos in Bogar were issued. 
The  recipients  were  basically  the  financial  system,  pension  funds  and  some  private 
investors. As Table 8 shows, the Province of Buenos Aires concentrated almost 40 % of the 
restructured debt. 
 
Table 8. Amount issued of Bogar (in nominal value) 
Provinces  Millions of pesos  % of total 
Buenos Aires  7,397  38 
Cordoba  2,337  12 
Chaco  1,101  6 
Formosa  995  5 
Entre Rios  916  5 
Other provinces  6,816  35 
Total  19,562  100 
Note: based on Ministerio de Economía, Argentina. 
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In June 2005, 75% of total provincial debt (10.7% of GDP) was constituted by debt 
with  the  FFDP  and  bonds.  The  FFDP  became  responsible  of  servicing  the  debt  of  the 
original holders of provincial debt. Bonds issues under foreign legislation did not enter the 
debt conversion process, except for the cases noted above. Initially it was decided by an 
agreement  between  the  national  government  and  the  provinces  in  early  2002  that  the 
renegotiation of these debts would follow the same guidelines as national government debt, 
but soon after the provincial administrations started to handle the renegotiation process 
autonomously. 
 
B. Bonds under foreign legislation 
 
The city of Buenos Aires and seven Argentine provinces had issued bonds under foreign 
legislation before the 2001 crisis.
2 These bonds added up to 4.3 billion US dollars. Some 
local  bondholders  accepted  to  exchange  them  for  Bogar,  as  part  of  the  conversion  of 
provincial debt under domestic legislation. 
Initially  the  nation  reached  agreements  with  the  provinces  to  renegotiate  this 
provincial debt abroad under the same terms as the national debt. However, due to the delay 
in  the  renegotiation  of  national  debt  until  2005,  each  province  followed  its  own 
renegotiation  strategy.  Some  provinces  reached  settlements  that  were  more  like  the 
settlements of the private sector, i.e., friendlier than the solution reached by the national 
government. Moreover, some provinces never defaulted on these bonds.  
The provinces that fully complied with their debt services were Tierra del Fuego 
(Bono  Albatros  for  55  million  US  dollars,  already  cancelled)  and  Salta  (Bono 
Hidrocarburífero for 234 million US dollars, with an annual interest rate of 11,5 %), who 
issued these bonds under New York law, guaranteed by oil royalties, and always serviced 
debt punctually. 
The province of Santiago del Estero was the first to restructure its debt in June 
2002. It had issued Bonos Ley 6379 for 108 million US dollars at a fixed interest rate of 
15,875%  per  year.  The  interest  rate  was  maintained,  and  there  was  no  reduction  in 
                                                 
2  This  sub-section  draws  on  accounts  published  in  provincial  newspapers,  as  well  as  information  from 
provincial governments, Economía & Regiones and Sosa and Farah (2005a, 2005b).   24 
principal, but the maturity was extended to June 2016, with equal amortization payments 
every six months starting June 2005. The bond carries a guarantee of coparticipated taxes. 
The city of Buenos Aires was the second to restructure its debt, in March 2003. It 
had issued Bonos Tango for 600 million US dollars, reaching an agreement to extend the 
maturity 3 years and to reduce the interest coupons (there was a 30% reduction in interest, 
starting with a 4% annual rate in 2003, and annual rates between 6,65 y 8,05% in the 
following years). 
The province of Mendoza, which had issued the Bonos Aconcagua for 250 million 
US dollars, faced a complicated renegotiation process that was threatened on two occasions 
by lawsuits from external bondholders. An offer to extend the original maturity from 2007 
to 2018, and to reduce the interest coupons by half was made in October 2004, with an 
acceptance above 70% that was achieved in successive stages. There are still around 70 
million dollars of the original Bono Aconcagua pending, so there are plans to reopen the 
exchange process in 2006 to avoid new judicial proceedings. 
The province with the largest stock of bonds issued under foreign legislation was 
Buenos  Aires.  This  province  suspended  all  debt  services  in  January  2002.  In  the 
restructuring offer, 2.7 billion US dollars were presented from sixteen bonds, issued in 
dollars, yens, Swiss francs and euros, under the legislation of Germany, Switzerland and 
the United States. Most of bondholders were small. The restructuring process took longer 
than that of the national government, finishing in early 2006 with an acceptance rate of 
94%. Three types of bonds were issued, Bono Descuento, Bono Descuento a Corto Plazo, 
and Bono Par a Largo Plazo, for 2.3 billion US dollars, extending the original maturity and 
reducing the interest rates. The offer implied a haircut of 55 % on a net present value of  4.3 
billion US dollars (total debt, including interest arrears). 
There  are  two  provinces  for  which  we  only  have  partial  information  about  the 
renegotiation process: the province of Tucuman, which issued a Eurobond (series 4) for 200 
million US dollars, on which it did not default initially; and the province of San Juan, 
which issued one of its two series of Bono Los Caracoles under foreign legislation. The 
bond  was  for  50  million  US  dollars  and  went  into  default,  but  presently  San  Juan  is 
studying alternatives to restructure this debt. 
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C. Bonds that circulated as provincial monies 
 
Already  in  the  1980s  some  provincial  governments  had  started  to  issue  bonds  that  in 
practice  were  used  to  pay  transactions  within  each  province.  These  provincial  monies 
competed with the pesos in circulation, and when issued beyond a certain point they started 
to be quoted at a discount in relation to the peso (these bonds were not legal tender outside 
their own province). 
Though these issues were important within each province, in 2000 they represented 
a total of 600 million pesos, less than 4% of total circulation of pesos. From 2000 on, the 
circulation started to grow since the national government issued Lecop, and the province of 
Buenos Aires Patacones, to finance their deficit.
3 Both totaled 5.9 billion pesos by 2002. 
The overall stock of quasi-monies (cuasimonedas, provincial monies plus Lecop) had then 
reached 7.8 billion pesos, 4.5 billion of which in provincial monies. This represented 42% 
of total monetary circulation in pesos.   
In  2003,  the  national  government  created  a  program  of  monetary  unification  by 
which it issued bonds (Boden 12 and 13) to turn over to the central bank, in exchange for 
pesos with which to rescue the provincial monies. This provincial debt entered the FFDP, 
and  carried  a  guarantee  of  tax  coparticipation,  the  part  of  national  taxes  distributed  to 
provinces. By the end of 2003 there were no more quasi-monies in circulation. The rescue 
did not have inflationary effects, since these provincial monies had already been integrated 
de facto into monetary circulation, besides the fact that it was a period of increasing money 
demand. 
 
V. Central bank bonds 
 
Tables 9 and 10 show the evolution of the stocks of bonds issued by the central bank, as a 
percentage of GDP and in millions of dollars. Previous to Convertibility, the Banco Central 
de  la  República  Argentina  (BCRA),  the  central  bank  of  Argentina,  conducted  most 
                                                 
3  The  national  government  issued  Lecop  to  cancel  debt  with  the  provinces.  The  problem  was  that  tax 
coparticipation, the tax-sharing scheme with the provinces, had been replaced by fixed payments. When tax 
receipts plummeted in 2001, there was a shortfall of receipts in relation to the fixed compromises assumed by 
the national government with the provinces.   26 
monetary policy operations through changes in reserve requirements. During the 1992-2001 
period, the BCRA was forbidden from issuing interest-paying bonds, but this has changed 
since 2002. 
During Convertibility, the liquidity of the financial system was regulated through 
international reserves, as well as through very limited open market operations, which are 
discussed  below.  During  the  1995  Tequila  crisis,  some  modification  of  reserve 
requirements were used, and some rediscounts were granted to commercial banks. Also, as 
additional instruments to regulate liquidity, the BCRA has been active with repos since 
1995.  
  During  the  1990s,  the  central  bank  started  emphasizing  minimum  capital 
requirements based on Basle guidelines for capital requirements according to the riskiness 
of  a  financial  institution’s  portfolio.  Reserve  requirements  were  replaced  in  1995  by 
liquidity requirements that could be invested in certain specified low risk assets. However, 
reserve requirements were reinstated in 2001.  
 
Table 9. Stock of central bank bonds (as a percentage of GDP) 
Domestic bonds  
(debt issued using domestic law) 
Domestic currency  Foreign 
Currency 1/   Nominal  Indexed 

































1991  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1992  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1993  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1994  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1995  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1996  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1997  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1998  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1999  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
2000  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
2001  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
2002  0.21 0 0.98 0  0 0 0 0 0  1.18 0 1.18
2003  0.06 0 0.97 1.20  0.14 0.37 0 0 0  2.74 0 2.74
2004  0.04 0 0.93 0.80  0.42 1.15 0 0 0  3.33 0 3.33
2005  0.02 0 2.30 0.41  0.39 1.25 0 0.57 0  4.94 0 4.94
Notes: Stocks refer to year-end figures. Short term is maturity up to one year, long term more than one year, calculated 
using database on individual bonds from BCRA; n.a. is not available. 1/ Corresponds to domestic currency bonds indexed to 
the exchange rate. 2/ The interest rate is a variable rate, namely, the Badlar rate. The Badlar rate is a wholesale rate, an 
average of the interest rates for time deposits above one million pesos offered by commercial banks, based on BCRA 
survey. Data for period 1985-1990 is not available. 
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Table 10. Stock of central bank bonds (in millions of dollars) 
Domestic bonds 
(debt issued using domestic law) 
Domestic currency  Foreign 
Currency  1/  Nominal  Indexed 


































1991  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1992  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1993  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1994  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1995  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1996  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1997  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1998  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
1999  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
2000  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
2001  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0
2002  191 0 897 0  0 0 0 0 0  1,087 0 1,087
2003  83 0 1,244 1,550  177 473 0 0 0  3,527 0 3,527
2004  54 0 1,394 1,202  625 1.734 0 0 0  5,009 0 5,009
2005  29 0 4,214 748  711 2,296 0 1,052 0  9,050 0 9,050
Notes: Stocks refer to year-end figures. Short term is maturity up to one year, long term more than one year, calculated 
using database on individual bonds from BCRA; n.a. is not available. 1/ Corresponds to domestic currency bonds indexed to 
the exchange rate. 2/ The interest rate is a variable rate, namely, the Badlar rate. The Badlar rate is a wholesale rate, an 
average of the interest rates for time deposits above one million pesos offered by commercial banks, based on a BCRA 
survey. Data for period 1985-1990 is not available. 
 
A. Monetary policy before and during Convertibility 
 
During most of the 1980s, the BCRA basically acted as the printing press for the national 
government, providing the main funding at a time when the country was in default and cut 
off from international credit (some provinces also issued provincial monies to get a share of 
the  proceeds  from  the  inflation  tax).  During  this  period,  deposits  had  extremely  high 
reserve requirements. This meant that in practice credit was directed by the BCRA, not the 
financial sector. Most of the credit was used to fund the national government. There were 
also rediscounts to provincial government banks, to failed private banks intervened by the 
BCRA, and to other policy priorities as defined by the national government. 
As the decade progressed, the process of inflationary finance accelerated, before 
finally collapsing amidst the hyperinflations of 1989 and 1990. In their aftermath came 
institutional reforms to give the central bank independence, and to prohibit the issue of 
money to finance government expenditure.   28 
The 1990s were dominated by the Convertibility  Law, approved in March 1991 
(Law 23.928), which set strict guidelines for the monetary policy to be followed by the 
BCRA. Monetary policy during Convertibility was endogenous. The law pegged the peso 
to the US dollar at the rate of 1 peso = 1 dollar. International reserves had to back 100% of 
monetary base, constituted by monetary circulation plus sight deposits of commercial banks 
at the BCRA (Braessas and Naughton 1996, chap. 4).  
In 1992 the charter (carta orgánica) of the BCRA  was reformed in accordance with 
the Convertibility Law. The charter allowed the central bank to hold negotiable Argentine 
government bonds as part of international reserves, valued at their market price, but with 
two limits. First, a flow restriction by which government bonds holding could not grow 
more  than  10%  per  year  (article  20).  Second,  a  level  restriction  in  relation  to  what 
constituted “convertible reserves”, by which government bonds had to be nominated in US 
dollars and they could not back more than 33% of monetary base (article 33). Hence, the 
creation of money was tied to the increase of international reserves. Though international 
reserves  had  to  back  100%  of  the  BCRA’s  monetary  base,  the  backing  of  financial 
liabilities (pasivos financieros) in pesos, constituted by monetary circulation, sight deposits 
of commercial banks and of the government at the BCRA, and the net position of reverse 
repos  (pases  pasivos)  with  the  financial  system  was  also  monitored  (Braessas  and 
Naughton 1996, chap. 4) 
 The BCRA was forbidden from extending credit either to the government sector or 
to  the  private  non-financial  sector.  During  the  1992-2001  period,  the  BCRA  was  also 
forbidden by its charter from issuing any kind of interest-paying bonds or debt. 
 
B. Open market operations with government bonds 
 
Table 11 shows that since 1995 the liquidity of the financial system has been regulated 
through open market operations with the financial system, except for a brief interruption 
during 2002 and 2003. These open market operations are undertaken using repos and swaps 
(pases  activos)  and  reverse  repos  and  swaps  (pases  pasivos).  These  operations  have  a 
guarantee in government bonds, which during Convertibility was mainly constituted by US 
T-bills or T-notes.   29 
 
Table 11. Reverse repos and swaps 
 
Millions of pesos  % of GDP 
1995  3,305 1.28
1996  5,119 1.88
1997  6,386 2.18
1998  9,932 3.32
1999  10,000 3.53
2000  9,317 3.28
2001  0 0
2002  0 0
2003  0 0
2004  5,524 1.23
2005  5,659 1.07
Notes: Stocks refer to year-end figures.  
 
When  the  BCRA  surrendered  9.5  billion  US  dollars  in  reserves  to  the  national 
government in January 2006, to cancel the outstanding debt with the IMF, it received in 
exchange  a  non-marketable  government  bond  with  zero  liquidity  denominated  “letra 
intransferible”.  Something  similar  had  happened  in  the  2003-2004  period,  when  the 
provincial monies were rescued and replaced by pesos. The Central Bank received two non-
marketable government bonds for 7.1 billion pesos, indexed by CER, as compensation. 
 
C. Central bank bonds issued since 2002 
 
After the abandonment of Convertibility, and the devaluation that ensued at the beginning 
of  2002,  in  March  of  that  year  the  BCRA  started  to  undertake  auctions  of  bonds 
denominated Lebac (Letras del Banco Central). Initially these bonds had 7-day maturities. 
These bonds helped to start normalizing a financial system that was completely jeopardized 
by the devaluation of the peso, amid pre-existing restrictions to withdraw cash from the 
financial system (the corralito). After the complete breakdown of credit, the Lebac auctions 
provided a reference rate for the domestic market in pesos. 
A second role the Lebac started to fulfill, from the second half of 2002 on, was that 
of monetary sterilization. At first it was necessary to neutralize the monetary expansion 
caused by the rediscounts to the financial system, when ample support was given to avoid a 
system-wide  crisis.  A  third  role  of  the  Lebac  was  to  sterilize  exchange  market  money   30 
creation, as the BCRA became a net demander of foreign currency. There were concerns 
that  inflation  might  keep  on  accelerating,  as  it  had  during  the  first  half  of  2002,. 
Subsequently, the great surplus of exchange from the external sector led to a more general 
policy of absorption that has been growing over time, as Table 12 shows. 
 
Table 12.  Factors of expansion and absorption of Extended Monetary Base (in millions of 
pesos) 
Variation of EMB 1/  2002 2/  2003  2004  2005 
Total  8,247 9,713 5,800 2,233
Private external sector  436 16,488 23,168 28,227
Net internal credit  7,811 -6,775 -17,368 -25,994
- Lebac and Nobac  -2,698 -5,040 -3,880 -10,031
- Other factors  10,510 -1,735 -13,489 -15,963
Notes: Our construction based on BCRA. 1/ EMB=Monetary Base in pesos + provincial monies. A negative sign indicates 
absorption. 2/ since February 11. 
 
To adapt to changing market circumstances, a longer-term instrument started to be 
issued, the Nobac (Notas del Banco Central). These bonds were issued both at fixed and 
variable rates. The variable rates were indexed to the US dollar, to the CER, and more 
recently to the Badlar rate, a rate for time deposits in pesos above 1 million pesos. 
During 2003 and 2004, the BCRA was able to extend the maturity of the stock of 
Lebac, at the same time that it paid lower interest rates. In 2005 the situation started to 
change. To avoid paying higher interest rates, the maturities started to be shortened, as 
Table 13 shows. Additionally, in the last months of 2005 the BCRA started to issue more 
Lebac and Nobac at variable rates, instead of explicitly paying higher fixed rates. 
 
Table 13. Average maturity of Lebac and Nobac issued each year 





Note: our calculation, using database of individual bonds from BCRA. 
 
At the end of 2005, the stock of bonds (excluding reverse repos) of the BCRA 
exceeded 9 billion US dollars, almost 5% of GDP. There is a large secondary market for   31 
Lebac and Nobac. In 2005 they represented 18% of total value of government sector bonds 
negotiated in the MAE (Mercado Abierto Electrónico), the local market where most of 
government sector bonds are traded. 
The placements of Lebac and Nobac are undertaken through auctions divided in two 
tranches,  a  competitive  tranche,  where  financial  institutions  and  institutional  investors 
participate in the determination of the cut-off rate, and a non-competitive tranche, where 
individuals and corporations participate through the intermediation of financial institutions. 
The main holder of Lebac and Nobac is the financial system, which concentrates 
almost 80% of the stock, using it as the instrument to place its excess liquidity. Lately,  
however, the strong growth of credit to the private sector has tended to reduce the appeal of 
these BCRA bonds. On the other hand, pension funds (AFJP) only have a small proportion 
of their investments in Lebac and Nobac. 
 
VI. Corporate bonds 
 
The  possibility  of  issuing  corporate  bonds  (obligaciones  negociables  or  ON)  appeared 
when Law 23.576 was approved in 1988. Before that, bank loans where the main source of 
funding  for  the  private  sector.  The  law  allowed  corporate  bonds  to  be  issued  by 
incorporated  companies,  cooperatives  and  other  organizations.  The  principal  could  be 
indexed,  interest  rates  could  be  fixed  or  variable,  issues  could  be  in  foreign  currency, 
payments could be made abroad, and there was free entry and exit from the country. 
This law on corporate bonds was modified in 1991 by Law 23.962. It was only then 
that the market for bonds started to take off and develop. The modification introduced in 
1991 basically had to do with tax exemptions of the value-added tax (VAT), the income tax 
and taxes on the transfer of bond instruments (títulos valores), giving corporate bonds the 
same tax treatment as sovereign bonds. All this had a positive impact on the incentives to 
issue  corporate  bonds.  This  leveled  the  field  with  bank  loans;  before  that,  companies 
basically preferred bank loans because of tax deductions allowed. 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were provided soon after with a simplified 
system to issue bonds that could be quoted on stock exchanges, to broaden their financing 
sources.  By  Decree  1.087  of  1993,  SMEs  were  authorized  to  issue  bonds,  with  the   32 
obligation of registering the bonds in the Comisión Nacional de Valores, the local securities 
exchange  commission,  and  of  complying  with  certain  specific  requirements  of  that 
commission. The restrictions which this simplified system imposed on SMEs had to do 
with the amount issued, the maturity and the type of investors. The maximum amount per 
firm was set at 5 million pesos. The bonds issued under this regime for SMEs could only be 
purchased  by  qualified  investors  within  certain  categories,  for  example,  public 
organizations, pension funds, and individuals with certain minimum capital. Despite this 
simplified regime, bond finance is typical of large firms rather than SMEs. 
 
Figure 6. Amount outstanding of corporate bonds and amount issued by financial 
institutions (in billions of dollars) 
Source: our database of corporate bonds from Argentina. 
 
Figure 6 shows the composition of corporate debt in terms of financial and non-
financial isuers. Table 14 shows the evolution of corporate bonds as a percentage of GDP, 
while Table 15 shows their evolution in millions of dollars. These figures are based on data 
from the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA), the main board of trade were many 
corporate  bonds  are  registered  to  trade,  the  Comisión  Nacional  de  Valores  (CNV),  the 
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the largest over the counter exchange in Argentina. Bedoya et al. (2007) discuss in detail 
the construction of this database of corporate bonds. 
 
Table 14. Stock of bonds issued by the corporate sector (as a percentage of GDP) 
  Domestic currency  Foreign 
Currency 
Total 




   
1989  0  0  0  0  0 
1990  0  0  0  0.05  0.08 
1991  0.05  0  0  0.31  0.36 
1992  0.06  0  0  0.94  1.00 
1993  0.05  0  0  2.57  2.61 
1994  0.04  0  0  3.53  3.57 
1995  0.04  0  0  4.23  4.27 
1996  0.03  0  0  4.86  4.89 
1997  0.11  0  0  6.82  6.93 
1998  0.09  0  0  8.32  8.41 
1999  0.15  0  0  8.82  8.96 
2000  0.15  0  0  8.50  8.66 
2001  0.19  0  0  8.00  8.19 
2002  0.15  0  0  17.03  17.17 
2003  0.12  0.01  0  11.97  11.75 
2004  0.17  0  0  9.31  9.48 
2005  0.14  0  0  7.63  7.78 
Notes: This information does not distinguish between domestic and foreign law issues. The database was constructed with 
information from Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA), Mercado Abierto Electrónico (MAE) and Comisión Nacional 
de Valores (CNV). 
 
Table 15. Stock of bonds issued by the corporate sector (in millions of dollars) 
Year  Domestic currency  Foreign 
Currency 
Total 




   
1989  6  0  0  0  6 
1990  37  0  0  62  99 
1991  89  0  0  514  603 
1992  126  0  0  1,980  2,106 
1993  117  0  0  6,072  6,189 
1994  105  0  0  9,083  9,187 
1995  93  0  0  10,933  11,026 
1996  82  0  0  13,227  13,309 
1997  325  0  0  20,013  20,338 
1998  258  0  0  24,896  25,154 
1999  407  0  0  25,014  25,422 
2000  445  0  0  24,182  24,626 
2001  522  0  0  21,346  21,867 
2002  151  0  0  16,804  16,954 
2003  153  11  0  14,787  14,951 
2004  260  10  0  14,136  14,405 
2005  259  8  0  13,829  14,096 
Notes: Year-end data. This information does not distinguish between domestic and foreign law issues. The database was  
constructed with information from Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires (BCBA), Mercado Abierto Electrónico (MAE) and 
Comisión Nacional de Valores (CNV). 
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The issue of  corporate  bonds was nil until 1989. The market started to become 
significant in 1991. After ten years of rapid growth, a sudden stop came in 2001. The stock 
of  corporate  bonds  from  2002  on  is  preliminary,  because  it  is  based  on  the  original 
conditions at time of issue and does not reflect pesification and default. The increase in 
nominal terms in 2002, both as percentage of GDP and in millions of pesos, merely reflects 
the threefold devaluation of the peso, with a stock that was almost completely in dollars. 
The 2002 devaluation was different from past experiences in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In  that  period,  a  devaluation  “melted  down”  company  debt  denominated  in  domestic 
currency, leaving the company in a better financial situation. On the contrary, the 2002 
devaluation provoked a  financial suffocation, since companies had begun to get deeply 
indebted abroad. Though bank debt in dollars was pesified at a rate of 1 to 1, this debt had 
lost participation in total debt since loans to the private sector had been continuously falling 
since 1998. During the Convertibility years, the ease of access to external credit and the 
good international financial conditions stimulated the growth of this kind of debt. 
Though  almost  all  corporate  bonds  were  issued  in  dollars,  we  do  not  have  a 
breakdown of these bonds according to domestic or foreign legislation. This breakdown is a 
key issue, because by Decree 214 of 2002, Article 8, all debt in foreign currency not related 
to the financial system (as was the case of corporate bonds) was converted to pesos at a 
ratio  of  one  dollar  equal  to  one  peso,  and  the  resulting  amount  was  indexed  by  CER 
(Article 4). Of course, this decree only applied to debt under domestic legislation, not to 
debt  under  foreign  legislation,  so  this  marks  a  huge  difference  between  domestic  and 
foreign law corporate bonds. 
In early 2002, risk-rating agencies placed most firms in selective default as regards 
liabilities in foreign currency. This rating was based on the fact that with the 2001 crisis, 
besides the devaluation, a series of government restrictions were put in place. Foremost, the 
central  bank  started  to  control  the  remittance  of  foreign  currency  abroad,  and  an 
authorization  was  required  to  make  payments  abroad.  This  came  together  with  great 
uncertainty about the final effects of the abandonment of Convertibility, in a context of 
government default, generalized violation of contracts, restrictions to withdraw funds from 
the financial system, and pesification of public service rates, deposits and debt. However, 
some companies were a lot less exposed than others to these risks. The greatest probability   35 
of default was for the firms that had suffered the pesification and freezing of their rates, and 
that served the domestic market, such as the distributors of gas and electricity, and the 
telephone companies. These firms were all heavily indebted in foreign currency. 
Due to widespread corporate default, after the 2001 debt crisis the corporate bond 
market came to a standstill. As Figure 7 shows, about 2/3 of corporate issuers rated by 
Standard & Poor’s went into default during 2002, and the process of renegotiation was 
pretty lengthy. However, by the end of 2005 most firms had renegotiated their debt. 
 
Figure 7. Corporate bond issuers and number in default, March 1992- December 2005 
Source: based on firms rated by Standard & Poor’s in Argentina. 
 
Though at first the majority of firms did not comply with payments of principal, a 
great majority did meet interest payments. In this dimension, the default on private debt 
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issued short-term bonds (valores de corto plazo), whose maturity  was less than a  year, 
mostly complied with the payments of principal.  
By mid-2002, there were already renegotiations underway in some important firms 
(Pecom, Banco Hipotecario, Impsa, Capex, Aeropuertos 2000), with a high percentage of 
acceptance by bondholders. The new conditions were relatively good and did not include 
either haircuts on principal or pesification, though there were extensions of maturity and, in 
some cases, reductions of interest rates. 
Subsequently, the restructuring of private debt came in all sorts of combinations: 
extension of maturities, lower interest rates, repayment of principal in installments, haircuts 
on principal, early redemption at a discount.  In all cases this implied a larger or smaller 
loss, in terms of present value, to the bondholders. Around 2003, with several restructurings 
already completed, the market value of these bonds started to improve. This was due to 
improved  economic  conditions  and  the  normalization  of  markets,  as  well  as  the 
anticipations of future debt renegotiations. 
 
VII. Pension funds 
 
At present, the most important institutional investors in Argentina are the pension funds 
(fondos  de  jubilaciones  y  pensiones,  FJP).  Other  important  institutional  investors  are 
insurance  companies  (compañias  de  seguros)  and  mutual  funds  (fondos  comunes  de 
inversión). The pension funds were born when the Argentina pension system was reformed 
by  Law  24.241  in  1993,  adding  a  new  capitalization  system  to  the  old  pay-as-you-go 
system (sistema de reparto). 
Despite some recent talk of undoing the 1993 pension reform, for the time being the 
capitalization system co-exits with the defined benefits system, which at present is being 
expanded to provide pensions to elderly people with no coverage. This reflects the fact that 
around  50%  of  employment  in  Argentina  is  informal,  and  many  workers  never  made 
contributions either to the capitalization or the the pay-as-you go systems. They are now 
being provided pensions to alleviate widespread poverty among elderly people. 
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Table 16. Annual contributions to pension funds   
Year  Billions of pesos  % of GDP 
1995  1.3  0.51 
1996  1.9  0.69 
1997  2.4  0.80 
1998  2.8  0.92 
1999  3.0  1.06 
2000  3.1  1.08 
2001  3.1  1.14 
2002  1.8  0.58 
2003  1.3  0.35 
2004  2.2  0.50 
2005  2.8  0.53 
Note: based on information from Superintendencia de AFJP. The figures correspond to fiscal years ended on 
June 30. 
 
The  capitalization  system  began  to  operate  in  mid-1994.  The  workers  capitalize 
mandatory contributions in a personal account at the AFJP (Administradoras de Fondos de 
Jubilaciones  y  Pensiones)  of  choice.  They  also  have  the  option  of  adding  voluntary 
contributions.  Table  16  shows  the  evolution  of  the  total  contributions  to  the  pension 
systems. Since voluntary contributions are not in the least bit significant, the aggregate 
basically reflects mandatory contributions. 
Due to the pension reform, the official budget deficit, which is measured on a cash 
basis, is not comparable before and after 1994. The 1993 reform led to a shift from a budget 
system that underestimated budget deficits by the increases in the accumulated unrecorded 
future government liabilities, to a budget system where the government explicitly issued 
government  bonds  in  lieu  of  these  unrecorded  liabilities;  the  recorded  budget  deficit 
basically increased by the amount of the contributions to AFJP since 1994. However, as 
more and more people are incorporated to the old pay-as-you go system, in recent years 
there is an underestimate of the deficit for the inverse reason. 
There are two distinct stages in the evolution of the pension funds. The first stage 
goes from the creation of the funds until 2001, the second from the moment before the 
sovereign default until the final debt renegotiation. During the first stage of the new system, 
there  was  at  first  a  very  sharp  increase  in  the  contributions  (net  of  charges)  to  the 
capitalization system, due to the massive switch of workers from the old pension system to 
the new. The inflows then stabilized at around 1% of GDP, until the debt default in 2001.    38 
 
Table 17. Evolution of stock of pension funds 
  Fund valuation  as percentage of total 
 
Billions of 
















1995  1.4  0.5  54.9  0.0  8.7  27.1  2.8  6.5 
1996  3.8  1.4  54.1  0.0  24.2  17.6  0.4  3.7 
1997  7.3  2.5  50.6  3.1  26.6  16.4  0.4  2.9 
1998  10.1  3.4  46.0  3.0  23.3  23.0  0.4  4.3 
1999  13.9  4.9  52.8  2.7  19.9  18.1  0.2  6.3 
2000  18.7  6.6  54.4  2.7  19.2  15.2  4.4  4.1 
2001  22.2  8.2  54.5  9.1  14.0  15.6  3.4  3.4 
2002  35.1  11.2  78.6  0.4  9.7  2.3  5.6  3.4 
2003  42.9  11.4  75.9  0.5  9.7  3.5  8.3  2.1 
2004  47.7  10.6  68.1  0.2  12.6  4.5  9.4  5.2 
2005  58.4  11.0  60.3  0.8  15.1  7.7  9.9  6.2 
Note: based on information from Superintendencia de AFJP. The figures correspond to fiscal years ended on 
June 30. 
 
From  the  beginning,  the  AFJP  had  a  high  share  of  their  portfolio  invested  in 
government bonds. As Table 17 shows, between 1994 and 2001 the share almost reached 
55% of the portfolio (except for small dip in 1997 and 1998, at time of Asian crisis and the 
Russian devaluation). As a percentage of GDP, the portfolio of government bonds reached 
4.5% in 2001. The pension funds were one of the main institutional investors that helped to 
finance the increase in cash budget deficit that their creation had provoked. Time deposits 
and equity were second in importance in the portfolios. Investments in corporate bonds 
(obligaciones negociables) had a minimal participation. 
The AFJP could not avoid being hit by the financial crisis that affected Argentina in 
2001, and the institutional and regulatory changes that ensued. In particular, in November 
2001  the  contributions  to  the  pension  funds  were  reduced  from  11%  to  5%  of  wages, 
increasing again to 7% in March 2003. Regulatory changes also affected insurance in case 
of handicap or death.  
The  contributions  after  2001  fell  not  only  because  of  the  reduction  in  the 
contribution rate, but also because of recession that led to a decrease in the number of 
regularly employed workers (in 2005 almost half the work-force was not registered, so it 
neither contributed to the system, nor was covered by it).    39 
During 2002, the share of government bonds in the total portfolio of pension funds 
almost reached 80%. This was the consequence of a series of events. First, trying to help 
avoid sovereign default, in November 2001 the AFJP in full entered the exchange that 
converted  government  bonds  into  guaranteed  loans.  Soon  after,  the  government 
compulsorily made them invest in a short-term bond, Letras del Tesoro, which represented 
10% of their portfolio at the end of 2001. At the beginning of 2002, default of sovereign 
debt  was  followed  in  a  series  of  short  steps  by  devaluation,  the  pesification  of  dollar 
deposits and the pesification of sovereign debt under domestic legislation. These changes 
lead to a 40 % rise in the nominal value of assets in domestic currency, an increase of 3 
percentage points of GDP between  2001 and 2002, as Figure 8 shows. 
 
Figure 8. Pension funds and share allocated to government bonds (as a percentage of GDP) 
Source: based on information from Superintendencia de AFJP.  
 
Despite the increase in nominal valuation, almost the whole portfolio of government 
bonds was in default, so this increase did not reflect a market valuation. Only one of the 
AFJP,  Nación  AFJP  linked  to  Banco  Nación,  formally  accepted  the  pesification  of  its 
portfolio of government bonds (guaranteed loans at that point in time). The other pension 
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despite the warning of the government that this would imply worse conditions than the 
terms initially offered for guarranteed loans.   
In the process of sovereign debt renegotiation, a special bond was finally designed 
for  the  pension  funds,  the  Quasi-par  bond.  With  the  exchange,  the  portfolios  were 
normalized in 2005 since all the AFJP participated in the debt exchange. The Quasi-par 
bond, which matures in 2045, represented about 70% of total holding of government bonds. 
These bonds were valued in the portfolios at face value and there was no secondary market 
where they could be negotiated. 
An interesting development in the post-default portfolios was the gradual increase 
of investments in other asset classes. In 2005, shares and bonds of private firms represented 
15% of the portfolio, though this was mostly concentrated in shares; corporate bonds were 
only 2% of portfolio. Investment in foreign shares, with 10 % of total, was the third asset 
class in terms of its importance. 
In 2005 there were twelve AFJP, half the pension fund administrators that existed 
when the capitalization regime was launched. The degree of concentration increased over 
time, since the four largest AFJP managed 67 % of the funds, up from 45 % in 1995. 
 
VIII. Secondary markets 
 
In this section, we review the evolution of the yields of sovereign bonds and corporate 
bonds, as well as the liquidity of the secondary markets in Argentina. 
 
A. Yields on sovereign bonds 
 
Figure 9 shows the evolution of the spreads of global government bonds (subject to foreign 
law) over US treasuries. The spread was at 500 basis points in early 2000, and reached 
1000 basis points by May 2001. After that, the spreads skyrocketed. Figure 10 shows that 
the spread between government bonds issued under domestic and foreign legislation (taking 
PRO2 and Global03, two government bonds of similar duration) increased in late 2001, 
after having hovered around 200 basis points in the previous years. 
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Figure 9. Spread of foreign law government bonds over US treasuries of similar 
duration (20-day moving average) 
Source: based on MAE and Reuters. 
 
Figure 10. Spread between government bonds subject to local and foreign law 
(20-day moving average) 
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After the formal declaration of default on government debt at the end of 2001, and 
the pesification of domestic debt in foreign currency, there was a huge devaluation of the 
peso, which shot up to a 4 to 1 ratio to the dollar, before stabilizing at the current 3 to 1 
ratio. Table 18 shows the prices of government bonds during the default period. 
 
Table 18. Government bond prices during default period 
  Domestic law  Foreign law 
  Compulsory issues  Market issues  Brady  Market issues 
  in pesos  pesified (from 
dollars) 
pesified (from 
dollars)  in dollars  in dollars  in dollars 
  Pro1  Pro2  Bonte04  FRB  Global03  Global17 
Parity at the end of November 2001 (%)  18.4  26.3  40.7  43.5  43.7  35.5 
Price in dollars, monthly averages             
 - Jan-02  9.6  10.8  19.9  30.5  28.0  27.5 
 - Jun-02  1.9  2.3  15.5  20.8  21.4  20.7 
 - Dec-02  6.7  9.2  19.6  20.4  21.4  23.1 
 - Jun-03  8.0  14.7  30.6  30.7  31.4  33.2 
 - Dec-03  6.1  12.9  23.0  28.2  24.9  27.7 
 - Jun-04  7.1  13.8  26.3  27.9  -  30.4 
Source: based on MAE. 
Figure 11 shows that spreads of government bonds over US Treasuries fell once the 
country approached debt renegotiation (the exchange was finally settled in June 2005). 
 
Figure 11. Spread of domestic law government bonds in dollars over US Treasuries 
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B. Yields on corporate bonds 
 
Figure 12 shows the yield curves for most liquid corporate bonds traded on the Mercado 
Abierto Electrónico (MAE). When a log curve is fitted to the data, one can clearly see that 
the curves shifted up over time, between 1994 and 1998, and again between 1998 and 2001. 
 
Figure 12. Yield curves for corporate bonds 
Source: based on most liquid corporate bonds, individual trades on Merval for 1994 and Hechos, MAE for rest. 
 
We would have expected to see higher rates of return on corporate bonds in view of 
the impending crisis, and of the widely announced and impending death of Convertibility. 
Figure 13 compares the evolution of a reference rate for medium term corporate bonds 
between April 1998 and December 2001, when the crisis burst and the market practically 
disappeared, with the rate of return on a representative sovereign bond, the FRB. The FRB 
had maturity of 7 years in April 1998, and of 3.3 years in December 2001. To construct the 
reference rates for medium term corporate bonds, we used the median of the rate of return 
of the bonds with maturities above one year and up to three years that were most liquid. 
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computed by MAE and reported in the monthly  issues of  Hechos  (note that the set of 
corporations changes over time). 
Figure 13. Rate of return on sovereign and medium term corporate bonds 
 Source: based on Hechos, MAE, April 1998-December 2001. 
 
The reference rate of return for medium term corporate bonds moved together with 
the FRB over most of this period. This is in agreement  with the conventional view in 
Argentina that the risk of private and public sector are not separable, but rather that they 
move  together  with  country  risk.  However,  as  of  April  2001  the  rate  of  return  on  the 
sovereign bond started rising steeply, while that of corporate bonds rose much more gently.  
In Figure 14 a similar procedure was followed to define a reference rate for long 
term corporate bonds. However, in this case there are usually only between one and three 
bonds, and in several months there is no data at all, especially during 2001, so this long 
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behavior of both series over time was much closer. However, one again sees that there is a 
point where the series drift apart, in this case in July and August 2001. 
Figure 14. Rate of return on sovereign and long term corporate bonds 
 Source: based on Hechos, MAE, April 1998-December 2001.  
 
Table 19. Trades of long-term bond from Transener on MAE 
Month  Maturity 
(in years) 





Amount traded  
(in dollars) 
Turnover 
(amount traded /amount 
outstanding) 
Sep-98  9.6  14.55  6  10,744,194  7.2 
Oct-00  7.5  11.79  4  4,948,133  3.3 
Feb-01  7.2  11.64  8  9,822,179  6.5 
Nov-01  6.4  20.68  2  1,252,504  0.8 
Source: Hechos, Mae and our database. 
 
Table  19  gives  as  an  example  one  particular  long-term  market  bond  issued  by 
Transener, a company engaged in the transmission of electric energy. As the table shows, 
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the  amount  traded  was  negligible  in  relation  to  the  150  million  dollars  of  outstanding 
bonds. 
A possible explanation for the discrepancy between both sets of rates of return is 
that the prices of corporate securities were not as representative as sovereign bonds. The 
domestic market for corporate bonds was small to start with, and it shrank even further 
during 2001. Table 20 shows the evolution of trades on the MAE over this period. This 
helps explain why there were no almost any quotes of long term corporate bonds at the end 
of 2001, so the increasing risk might not have been fully reflected in market prices. 
 
Table 20. Amounts traded on MAE (in millions of dollars) 
 Period  Sovereign bonds  Corporate bonds 
1996  318,067  717 
1997  337,937  903 
1998  169,975  808 
1999  153,295  778 
2000  217,297  859 
January 2001  18,345  94 
February  19,951  86 
March  20,111  35 
April  9,155  28 
May  12,365  92 
June  18,252  39 
July  9,601  36 
August  8,032  42 
September  3,983  47 
October  5,980  50 
November  4,389  45 
December  282  29 
2001  130,446  622 
January 2002  54  3 
February  178  1 
March  485  3 
April  507  1 
May  1,026  1 
June  196  1 
July  557  0 
August  806  0 
September  296  5 
October  204  8 
November  379  15 
December  393  14 
2002  5,082  52 
Source: Hechos, MAE. 
 
Another explanation for the discrepancy between corporate and sovereign bonds 
might be due to the fact that the market considered that corporate bonds were not as risky 
as government bonds. Though in most of the Convertibility period both rates of return 
tended to move together, some corporate issuers indeed did not go into default in 2001 and   47 
after.  Of  those  that  did,  the  renegotiation  of  corporate  bonds  usually  implied  smaller 
haircuts for bondholders than the haircuts applied to sovereign bondholders. We believe 
this might explain another part of the discrepancy  in the  yields between corporate and 
sovereign bonds in 2001, together with the fact that there were very few trades on domestic 
secondary markets so prices were not too representative. 
The yield curves for corporate bonds from 2004 on show that the yield on corporate 
issuers that did not default, for example firms from the oil industry like Petrobras Energia 
and YPF, was lower than those that defaulted like Autopistas del Sol, Banco Hipotecario, 
Banco Galicia. The difference was around 600 basis points in August 2004, and fell to 300 
basis points in November 2005 (BCRA 2004 and 2005). We believe this spread basically 
reflects the fact that the firms that did not default were in better financial shape that those 




The Mercado Abierto Electrónico (MAE) and the Mercado de Valores (Merval), are the 
most important domestic exchanges for bonds. Other exchanges outside of Buenos Aires 
are not very important in bond trading (Bolsa de Rosario and Bolsa de Bahía Blanca, for 
example, specialize in commodities). 
  The Merval is the exchange closely linked to the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos 
Aires (BCBA), were many of the corporate bonds are listed. On the other hand, MAE is an 
over-the-counter  exchange  whose  members  are  mainly  financial  institutions  focused  on 
fixed  income  securities.  To  be  negotiated  on  the  MAE,  corporate  bonds  have  to  be 
previously listed at the BCBA or some other board of trade in Argentina. Table 21 shows 
that the participation of MAE in the market for corporate bonds in Argentina is a bit larger, 
though the difference with Merval has dwindled with time (as to company shares, the two 
markets reached an agreement by which shares are only traded on the Merval since 1996). 
The  issues  of  national  government  bonds  tend  to  be  much  more  liquid  than 
provincial bonds, which are sometimes traded only two or three times per month (if at all). 
The same holds for corporate bonds. Indeed, despite the fact that in 2000 the stock of   48 
corporate bonds was 24 billion dollars, compared to 98 billion dollars of sovereign bonds 
and 4 billion dollars of provincial bonds (a ratio of 1 to 4), the total volume of corporate 
bonds traded represents a mere 1%, or less, of the amount traded in government bonds (a 
ratio of 1 to 100). 
 
Table 21. Trades on MAE and Merval, 1996-2004 
Total volume operated in MAE and MERVAL (in millions of dollars) 
  Government bonds  Shares  Corporate bonds  Total 
1996  448,744  35,221  717  484,683 
1997  407,102  41,188  1,351  449,641 
1998  204,287  30,528  1,169  235,985 
1999  187,485  12,685  1,122  201,292 
2000  245,486  9,691  1,469  256,646 
2001  147,104  7,554  1,022  155,680 
2002  16,803  1,570  111  18,484 
2003  31,468  2,897  185  34,549 
2004  51,005  4,489  601  56,095 
Share of MAE in volumes operated in MAE and MERVAL 
  Government bonds  Shares  Corporate bonds  Total 
1996  0.71  0.00  1.00  0.66 
1997  0.83  0.00  0.67  0.75 
1998  0.82  0.00  0.69  0.71 
1999  0.82  0.00  0.69  0.77 
2000  0.89  0.00  0.58  0.85 
2001  0.89  0.00  0.61  0.84 
2002  0.30  0.00  0.47  0.28 
2003  0.63  0.00  0.73  0.58 
2004  0.70  0.00  0.58  0.64 
 
  According to our database of corporate bonds, there were 68 companies with bonds 
outstanding in 2004, and 56 in 2005.  In  relation to corporate bonds that were  actually 
traded, we looked at companies whose bonds traded at least once during 2004-2005 (until 
August) in both MAE and Merval. There were 18 such companies, of which 7 were banks 
and 11 were non-financial companies. Of the 11 non-financial companies, Table 22 shows 
the liquidity of the 8 on which we had information on revenues. Except for two of the 
corporate bonds in Table 22, there were very few trades, and the rates of turnover were 
extremely  small.  The  great  majority  of  corporate  bonds  in  Argentina  resemble  private 
placements, which are often tailored to specific investors and have extremely low liquidity. 
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Table 22. Liquidity of corporate bonds of eight non-financial firms in 2004 




stock (millions of 
pesos) 
Days traded in 
year 





Autopistas del Sol S.A.  154  325  5  10  3 
Cablevisión S.A.  642  525  5  1  0 
Edesur S.A.  920  120  7  3  3 
Metrogas S.A.  720  321  2  2  1 
Multicanal S.A.  575  450  359  465  103 
Petrobras Energía S.A.  5494  1672  197  102  6 
Transener S.A.  220  518  1  1  0 
Transportadora de Gas 
del Sur S.A. 
905  503  11  7  1 
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